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Definition
The Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) is an independent self-
contained subsystem mounted onboard a launch vehicle.
AFSS has been developed by and is owned by the US Government
Autonomously makes flight termination / destruct decisions using configurable
software-based rules implemented on redundant flight processors using data
from redundant GPS/IMU navigation sensors
AFSS implements rules determined by the appropriate Range Safety officials
Applications
— Primary or back-up system for Range Safety Operations
— Crew advisory system for human space flights
— Training tool for traditional human-based flight termination systems
AFSS Advantages
— Global coverage
— Decreased need for ground-based assets
— Increased launch responsiveness
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.4r	 Motivation and History
"The Future Management and Use of the U.S Space Launch Bases and Ranges" by the
Office of Science and Technology Policy and National Security Council, 2/8/2000,
Recommendation #6
...the Air Force and NASA should develop a plan to examine, explore, and proceed with next-
generation range technology development and demonstration ... for reusable and expendable launch
vehicles.
Phase 1, FY00 Contractor R&D Feasibility Demonstration
— Very limited subset of flight algorithms/destruct rules on PC
Phase 2, FY02 Contractor Bench Prototype with Simulation Testing
— Limited set of safety rules on PowerPC, VME bus, VxWorks
— Simulated launch scenarios using 2 Ashtech G-12 GPS receivers
Phase 3, FY2003-2009 NASA KSC/WFF project
— Goal is a flight qualifiable system
— Design and test to more rigorous requirements with improved algorithms
— Redundancy management
— More extensive simulation and flight testing 	 3
Key Concepts
• AFSS is a primarily a smart software system. Use commercial hardware
whenever possible.
• Design to known requirements and take best guess at satisfying new
requirements: RCC-319, RCC-324, AFSPCMAN 91-710, NASA-STD-
8719.13B, NASA-STD-8739.8, Internal ConOps, Project Plan, etc.
• Simulations necessary for testing, debugging and certification.
• Configuration file contains mission-specific flight rules.
• Telemetry preferred for post-flight analysis.
• Simple instantaneous vacuum impact point is not enough for safety
decisions.
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Summary of Key Design Policies
• Independence-from-vehicle systems as much as practically possible
• Configurable hardware architecture (fixed for a specific vehicle)
• Configurable mission rules (fixed for a specific flight profile)
• NAV sensor redundancy management performed in software
• Redundancy management provides for graceful degradation as sensors
and processors fail (within constraints set by Range Authorities)
• Flight Processor/Command Function redundancy management
performed in hardware via redundant CSLIC architecture
• Processor-to-processor communications minimized
• Mission rules evaluated against one selected navigation solution
• Majority voting on ARM/FIRE with tie resulting in function
• AFSS application must generate a square-wave pulse train monitored by
a circuit independent of processor
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Core Simulation Set
A set of 20 core simulations for two different vehicles is used to test and
validate the AFSS rules.
Vehicle 1	 Wallops Express. A theoretical rocket composed of a
Peacekeeper first stage and a Pegasus upper stage.
Vehicle 2	 Kodiak Athena Star.
Nominal trajectory No pitch-over
Stage-1 hang-fire IIP Violations
Loss of all data at T+0 Loss of data-green time violation
Pitch over shoulder Tracking solutions diverge
Obvious erratic flight No fairing separation
Tumble turn Fails to make orbit gate
No stage 2 or stage 3 ignition Flight elevation limits
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4 A 4	 AFSS Mission Rules
• Parameter Threshold Violation — a trajectory value exceeds an allowed
limit
— Rocket stage ignition and burnout detection
• Physical Boundary Violation — present position or Instantaneous
Impact Point (IIP) is out of a corridor or in an exclusion zone
• Gate Rule
— Two-Point Gate Rule — determines if a current position or IIP has crossed a
gate formed by two points
— Moving Gate Rule — determines if the current position or IIP is in front of or
behind a moving two-point gate
Green-Time Rule — determines how long the rocket can safely fly
without receiving valid updated tracking data
All mission rules can be dependent upon other mission rules.
A rule violation does not need to result in a flight termination action. 	 7
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AFSS CSLIC Overview
• Traditional ARM then FIRE destruct command
sequence
• One master firing circuit with four inhibits in line
with initiator during normal ground operations
• No (known) single point failures that could
produce inadvertent firing
• Multiple single point logic gate failures that could
inhibit FIRE command — two CSLIC units in
parallel required for total system compliance to
RCC319
• Majority voting performed in hardware to
activate FIRE
• Unanimous `voting' performed in hardware for
RTL
• Continued use of redundant/parallel CRD and
ADS must be supported external to AFSS
• CSLIC is the only custom hardware used by
AFSS.
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Vehicle Tests
Feb. 3, 2005, van test Kennedy Space Center industrial area
MIP 405 computer, Javad JNS-100 GPS receiver, roof-mounted commercial
GPS antenna, battery pack, laptop computer for monitor and control
— Tested Parameter Thresholds Violation (speed limit), present position
boundary, exit gate
— Successful test
— Lessons learned on ignition/staging events and timing tolerance to compensate
for multitasking processing delays
Sept. 27, 2005, single engine plane near Kennedy Space Center
— MIP 405 computer, Javad JNS 100 GPS receiver, dash-mounted commercial
GPS antenna, battery pack, laptop computer for monitor and control
Tested present position and IIP boundaries, moving and exit gates, green time
— Successful test, system performed as expected
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First Rocket Test, Test Article #1
Apr.6, 2006, Modified Terrier Orion sounding rocket at WSMR
– Internal Javad JNS100 and external Ashtech G12 GPS receivers, skin-
mounted wraparound GPS antenna, two MIP405 single-board
computers, payload power
– Data recorded onboard and sent via vehicle telemetry to the launch
head
– Two sets of flight rules—one for each processor. One nominal, one
non-nominal
– Environmental testing to rocket specifications
– Prelaunch testing included loading/verifying the application and
configuration files, simulated sensor data
All flight rules performed as expected
– Ashtech G12 receivers lost lock at ignition and did not reacquire during
flight
– Flash memory hardware problem on one processor but data was in
telemetry	 11
Test Article #1, Test Corridor
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Second Rocket Test, Test Article #2
March 21, 2007, SpaceX Falcon 1 at Reagan Test Site
— Internal and external Javad JNS100 receivers, single skin-mounted patch GPS
antenna, two Radstone IMP2A flight processors, custom-designed and built voting
circuit, payload power
— Data sent via vehicle telemetry to the launch head
— Same set of flight rules for both processors
• Test boundary rule to artificially produce a destruct condition with a nominal trajectory
— More extensive testing of Concept of Operations
• Vehicle integration and test, range integration and test flow, countdown operations, vehicle
launch and flight operations, post-boost system safing
— Both processors properly detected hang fire and lift-off
— Anomaly in externally housed GPS data caused early spurious detection of stage-1
burnout and stage-2 ignition events on one flight processor
— Both processors correctly issued and safed ARM/FIRE commands when flying into
and out of planned IIP exclusion zone
— Both processors issued ARM/FIRE commands due to a violation of a moving gate
rule set up to catch erratic flight from in-plane vehicle failures
— Both GPS receivers maintained navigation solution throughout flight
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Test Article #2., Test Corridor
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4 A .1	 Upcoming Test Article #3
February 2010, sounding rocket at WFF
• Loosely-coupled GPS/IMU Solution
— Kalman Filtered Javad 100 GIPS receiver and a Honeywell HG 1700 IMU
• Backplane redesign
— Redesigned backplane and improved processors
• Software Upgrades
— Include additional coding. Safing commands will be included and pre-launch test code
has been upgraded.
• Simulated FTS Circuit
— Simulate actual voltage and current requirements.
• Graphical User Interface
— The ground support equipment will have a modified graphical user interface to
relieve operators from manual commands
• Low Cost TDRSS Transceiver first test in receive mode
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What's Next?
We believe we have shown that AFSS is viable.
Our ultimate goal is commercialization or transfer to industry or
government agencies as government-furnished software with the
NASA team maintaining an advisory role.
Need to finish:
• Ivv
• Software standards
• Orbital launch
• Miniaturized hardware if possible
• Better requirements—AFSS is a new paradigm and it needs to "emulate a
Range Safety officer's mind". The current requirements do not exist for this.
• NASA will finish its development in 2-3 years with adequate funding and
support.
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